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Introduction 
The primary objective of the current paper is to capture the experiences of a range of 
stakeholders in relation to the quality of financial reporting of Libyan Commercial Banks 
(LCBs) by seeking their perceptions regarding the issue of earnings management. This paper 
investigates stakeholders' understanding and awareness of earnings management as a concept 
and whether they think earnings management does take place among LCBs; their views on 
the techniques used to manage LCBs' earnings and on possible motivations behind such a 
practice are also examined. The paper also seeks views about how earnings management can 
be prevented or deterred, including perceptions about the role and potential role of accounting 
standards and corporate governance. Earnings management has continued to be problematic 
in the financial reporting context throughout recent decades (Heinz et al., 2013) and is an 
important topic that concerns a wide range of stakeholders including regulators, investors and 
managers (Achilles et al., 2013). Its importance stems from its negative effects on financial 
statements’ credibility (Man and Wong, 2013) as it involves deliberate management 
intervention in the financial reporting process to misstate reported earnings in order to 
achieve certain rewards (Foster and Shastri, 2013). It can be argued that earnings 
This is the accepted manuscript version of Earnings management in Libyan commercial banks: perceptions of 
stakeholders,by Yasser Barghathi; David Collison; Louise Crawford, International Journal of Accounting, 
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management might be used to make information more informative for outsiders given the 
deep knowledge that managers would have about their activities. Indeed, Aerts et al. (2013, 
p.94), do distinguish between “manipulative [opportunistic] and communicative 
[informative]” earnings management. However, they criticise both practices as leading to 
uncertainty in the minds of users. 
In addition, opportunistic earnings management, according to Habbash et al. (2013), reduces 
the quality of reported income as it produces less reliable reported earnings that do not reveal 
the true financial performance of the firm. In the words of Ascioglu et al. (2012), earnings 
management clearly “degrades the quality” of reported income as well as that of financial 
disclosure in general (p.258). Also, earnings quality, according to Ebaid (2013), plays a major 
role in financial reporting quality given the importance of the earnings figure as a “premier 
source of firm-specific information” (p.261). Indeed, according to McKee (2005, p.1), it 
represents “the single most important item in financial statements”. 
The existence of earnings management, through its adverse effect on financial reporting 
quality, also constitutes a serious breach of the accountability process whereby managers 
should provide useful, unbiased, and reliable information to the firm’s stakeholders.  
The quality of financial reporting represents a core element of accountability between 
preparers and report users. According to Ijiri (1983), the fundamental objective of the 
accounting system within the accountability framework is fairness. Fair accounting 
information, according to Ijiri (1983), can be seen as that accounting information which is 
objective and verifiable. Being objective means that accounting information presented to an 
accountee is free from bias while verifiability means that “there are sufficient trails to enable 
anyone to reconstruct the information” (p. 75). Based on the above discussion, in order for 
the accountability process to be fulfilled, financial reporting needs to be perceived as of high 
quality. Within the accountability framework, accounting information should be fairly 
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presented and characterised as objective and reliable. In this study, the accountability process 
is deemed to be taking place when high quality financial reporting1 is perceived as being 
obtained.  
In other words, financial information has to be unbiased and free from management’s 
intervention so that managers are perceived to be accountable. This paper focuses on the 
extent to which the Libyan Commercial Banking sector is perceived to be accountable.  
Regardless of the regulatory efforts that have been made to preclude earnings management, 
this managerial behaviour, according to Beaudoin et al. (2013), still exists and continues to 
concern related parties: practitioners, regulators and standard setters. Therefore, it is of great 
importance to understand this behaviour and highlight some means of minimizing its 
damaging consequences. According to Krishnan and Visvanathan (2011): "earnings 
management is believed to be widespread and a matter of concern to regulators and users of 
financial statements" (p. 133). For Cotter (2012), the existence of such a practice is due to the 
fact that we live in a world that falls some way short of the perfect world. 
This study’s importance stems basically from the importance of the issue of financial 
reporting quality in terms of accountability: accountability in the context of this paper 
represents the relationship between banks’ management and other stakeholders in which 
managers are obliged to be accountable by producing high quality financial reporting. Also, 
as earnings management concerns a wide range of stakeholders, LCBs' stakeholders should 
be interested in the study's results that will be discussed later. In addition, research in other 
developing countries may be informed by the results of this study. According to the results, 
                                                 
1 In accordance with the International Accounting Standards Board's (IASB) conceptual framework, the quality 
of financial reporting can be assessed by reference to whether useful financial information has been provided. 
To be useful, financial information must be relevant and faithfully representative. To enhance the relevance and 
faithful representation of useful financial information, another four qualitative characteristics have to be met so 
that financial information could be considered of high quality: comparability, verifiability, timeliness and 
understandability (IASB, 2010). 
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“earnings management” as a term is not widely understood; indeed the term has been 
interpreted by a number of interviewees in a quite different way as described below in the 
findings. However, the concept of what might more usefully be described as “earnings 
manipulation” was well understood by the interviewees.  The fact that earnings management 
is practiced in LCBs is consistent with the literature, and suggests that this study should be of 
interest to auditors and regulators, and of course other stakeholders who make decisions 
based on LCBs' financial statements. Findings also revealed the techniques by which earnings 
management is understood to be practiced including, in particular, by manipulation of the 
“loan loss provision” (LLP). However, the results also suggest other ways used by LCBs' 
managers to change their earnings. These methods should be of interest to auditors who have 
a responsibility to provide an opinion on financial statements. Moreover, if some of these 
techniques are clearly incompatible with generally accepted accounting practice2 (GAAP) 
and therefore amount to fraud, our findings again should be of high importance and interest to 
all stakeholders. All in all, the financial reporting of LCBs is perceived as of reduced quality 
due to earnings management, which therefore may be seen as an explicit breach of 
accountability. However, interviewees perceived that both IFRS and improved corporate 
governance could positively influence the quality of financial reporting by reducing earning 
management practices and therefore increasing user confidence and enhancing the 
accountability of LCBs' managers. 
The findings of this study are interpreted from an accountability perspective which may 
potentially be seen as a contribution. Many studies on earnings management have been 
carried out based on other theoretical perspectives. Habbash (2010), for example, examined 
the effectiveness of corporate governance and external audit on earnings management 
practices in the UK using agency theory. Also, Alghamdi (2012) carried out a study to 
                                                 
2 The nature of what constitutes GAAP in the Libyan context is discussed later in the paper. 
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investigate earnings management practices by Saudi listed companies using both agency 
theory and institutional theory. However, with reference to the importance and impact of the 
banking sector, not only to shareholders but to other stakeholders and to the functioning of 
society as a whole, a wide accountability perspective is commended as having particular 
salience. 
The next two sections explain the theoretical framework of this study, and the study's 
background and motivations. The subsequent section presents the research method and the 
research questions. This is followed by the results of the study which are considered under 
the headings of: the quality of financial reporting; earnings management (EM) awareness; 
EM existence; EM techniques; EM motivations and EM constraints. The penultimate section 
presents a discussion, and this is followed by the conclusion.   
Theoretical framework 
As has already been noted, this study adopts an accountability based framework. This theory 
can describe two types of relationships: a narrow type that is, for example, between managers 
and shareholders and a wider type in which an accountability relationship arguably exists 
between managers and society at large. According to the wide type of accountability, 
accounting information is used by a wide range of groups i.e. current and potential investors, 
auditors, regulators…etc. The wide notion also holds that not only financial information 
would be communicated to these groups. In addition it holds that confidence in the integrity 
of an accountability process is important to members of a society who may not themselves be 
direct recipients of information. The accountability perspective can be based on the 
assumption that a conflict of interest may arise between the accountor and the accountee.  
In terms of the earnings management issue, the accountor may be motivated to engage in 
earnings management practices to ensure maximisation of his/her benefit and the accountee 
may therefore adopt a mechanism to monitor the accountor’s performance. Therefore, the 
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accountability framework can be well suited for organizations whose services affect many 
stakeholders who may have both financial and non-financial interests in the organization, in 
other words, public accountability (Perks, 1993), as is the case with Libyan Commercial 
Banks3.  
The accountability framework is deemed to be the proper one to cover this study's objectives 
as it conceptually matches well the relationships between a bank’s management and other 
stakeholders. In addition, research findings may be interpreted from an accountability 
perspective i.e. recognising the consequences that earnings management practices may have 
on the accountability system. One of the ways in which accountability is used in the academic 
context, according to Bovens (2010), is as a normative concept to evaluate the actor’s 
behavior.  
Background and motivations for the study 
The first motivation for this study stems from the need to focus on the importance of 
accountability through high quality financial information and the threats to this accountability 
caused by earnings management. As discussed above, this study aims to investigate the 
earnings management issues in LCBs from the viewpoint of various stakeholders. The notion 
behind selecting commercial banks for the study stems partially from the importance of such 
a sector through its role in the economy. Banks have a central function in the economy, 
keeping the savings of the public and financing the development of business and trade; this 
central role of banks justifies particular scrutiny of their performance. Moreover, given the 
crucial importance of the accountability system of banks, confidence in the financial 
reporting of banks is in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, e.g., regulators, 
                                                 
3 Public accountability, according to Perks (1993), is applicable to any entity that is responsible to the public. 
Needless to say, many groups (stakeholders) are or would be affected by commercial banks’ activities and 
performance i.e. employees, clients and wider society. The recent financial crisis which has had far reaching 
effects socially in many countries clearly exemplifies this point. 
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customers, investors, and society as a whole. The failure of banks “can result in systemic 
crises with adverse consequences for the economy as a whole” (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010, p. 
189). This of course has been clearly seen in many countries as a result of the recent banking 
crisis. 
Another reason for choosing LCBs for the study is that the majority of listed companies on 
the Libyan Stock Market are commercial banks; such listing gives additional significance to 
the need for stakeholders, and in particular shareholders, to have confidence in LCBs 
accountability. 
The literature provides ample evidence of earnings management in developed countries. 
However, relatively little research has been conducted for developing countries in general 
(Habbash and Alghamdi, 2015) and for Libya in particular. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this study, in focusing on listed commercial banks, is the first of its kind in Libya. 
Therefore, the current study may help in filling a gap by illustrating results from a sector 
which plays a key economic role in a specific developing country. Moreover, the research 
findings from developed countries are not necessarily applicable to developing countries due 
to the different environmental factors which may be present. Companies operating in 
developing countries are unlike those of developed countries in many respects: according to 
Baralexis (2004), they typically suffer from poor management and having unsophisticated 
users of financial information. Therefore, earnings management perceptions in developing 
countries might be different from those in developed countries. 
In addition, prior research has stressed the importance of evaluating perceptions of earnings 
management to provide an overall assessment of the climate surrounding the activity in each 
country individually. According to Geiger and Smith (2010), “it is critically important to 
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examine the perceptions of individuals from different countries in an attempt to evaluate the 
climate for earnings management that may exist…” (p. 21). 
This study explores stakeholders’ views regarding the practices of earnings management 
within Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs), including specific techniques, and motivations. 
Their perceptions of the overall quality of financial reporting in Libya were also sought as 
were their views about how the issue could be addressed. Regarding the latter question, views 
on two aspects were sought; these were financial accounting standards and corporate 
governance.  
Financial reporting regulations have an important role to play in this area and the IASB as a 
regulator body is, according to Cotter (2012), making every effort to reduce flexibility that 
may be offered by International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in order to restrict 
earnings management practices. Accounting standards, according to Zhang et al. (2013), 
affect the level of earnings management, e.g., they will determine the degree of managerial 
discretion with regard to revenue and loss recognition. IFRS have been mainly developed in 
order to harmonise accounting information globally. However, the introduction of IFRS is 
attracting scholars to investigate their effect on accounting quality and therefore earnings 
management (Zhang et al., 2013).  
This paper investigates, inter alia, stakeholders' views in regard to the influence and potential 
influence of IFRS on LCBs' financial reporting quality. Although there is a lack of formal 
local accounting standards in Libya, there is a degree of de facto accounting standards setting, 
as well as statutory regulation. Accounting practices are influenced to a large extent by the 
accounting education system which is itself mainly influenced by US and UK GAAP 
(Mahmud and Russell, 2003). In addition, laws and regulations have also been identified as 
key determinants that affect accounting practices. For example, the commercial law, the 
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income tax law, the stock market law, and the commercial banks law have all influenced 
accounting practices in Libya (El-Firjani, 2010).  Some areas in tax law which influenced 
accounting practices can be identified; fixed assets, for example, are recognised at historical 
cost and depreciated using the straight-line method with specified rates for different types of 
asset being given. Another example is setting-up costs which are allowed to be depreciated 
over five years using again the straight-line method. The tax law allows for goodwill 
depreciation over twenty years using the straight-line method and goodwill must be 
purchased. Article 38 of the law states that donations of up to 2% of net income are allowed 
to be deductible, but only if paid to authorized charities that are recognised by the state. 
Losses can be carried forward for up to five years. 
Corporate governance, defined as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Cadbury, 1992), also has a key role to play in establishing the culture within 
which financial reporting takes place. In response to the well-known accounting scandals, 
such as Enron and World-com, new regulations on corporate governance have been 
introduced worldwide (Lai, 2011). Moreover, these scandals stressed the crucial role that 
corporate governance can play to promote financial reporting quality (Choi et al., 2004). 
Corporate governance as a monitoring mechanism may have a positive effect on earnings 
quality (Ebaid, 2013) and can reduce the adverse effect of earnings management on the 
quality of financial reporting which helps in improving investors’ confidence (Uadiale, 
2012). More clearly, in the U.S., for example, good corporate governance strengthens the 
ability to reduce earnings management practices (Yang et al., 2012). This study investigates 
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stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the effect that good corporate governance can have on 
earnings management by banks4.  
Research Method 
Consistent with previous studies, for example, Cohen et al. (2010), Beasley et al. (2009), and 
Cohen et al. (2013), a semi-structured interview method was used to address the research 
questions. Interviews, according to Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), are commonly used in 
qualitative research. Gillham (2000) indicates that interviews are normally conducted in 
research “to obtain information and understanding of issues relevant to the general aims and 
specific questions of a research project” (p. 2). Gillham (2005) describes interviews as the 
most important research approach because of their flexibility, their structure, and the quality 
of the information that can be obtained. Flexibility means that a researcher can change the 
planned sequence of questions as required, and follow up on any interesting new issues that 
may be raised. 
In addition to being flexible, Creswell (2003) suggested that an interview is a useful method 
when participants cannot be observed. It is also beneficial when participants are able to 
provide historical information. Creswell (2003) has also noticed some limitations of 
interviews: 
“(i) provides indirect information filtered through the views of interviewees, (ii) 
provides information in a designated place rather than the natural field setting, 
(iii) researcher’s presence may bias responses, and (iv) people are not equally 
articulate and perceptive” (p. 186). 
The paper tries to answer the following research questions: 
                                                 
4 A corporate governance code for the commercial banks has been issued by the Central Bank of Libya and all 
commercial banks operating in Libya have to adhere to this Code. This Code was issued in 2006 based on 
OECD principles of corporate governance as well as the Basel Report on Banking Supervision for enhancing 
corporate governance for banking organisations with the aim to protect both shareholders and stakeholders 
(Zagoub, 2011). 
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1. To what extent is earnings management perceived to influence the quality of financial 
reporting in LCBs? 
❖ What do LCBs' stakeholders mean by the term 'earnings management'? 
❖ How are LCBs’ perceived as being able to manage their earnings? 
❖ What are the perceived motivations behind the earnings management practices in 
LCBs? 
❖ How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive earnings management in terms of business 
ethics? 
❖ What factors were perceived as enabling LCBs to manage earnings? 
2. To what extent, from an accountability perspective, could such perceptions be 
addressed? 
❖ What do LCBs' stakeholders perceive to be the implications of adopting IFRS in 
relation to earnings management? 
❖ How do LCBs' stakeholders perceive the implications of good corporate governance 
in relation to earnings management? 
In order to answer the research questions, interviewees were asked several questions as listed 
in Appendices 1 and 2. The interview questions were originally constructed in English and 
then translated into Arabic. While not translated by a formal agency the translation in Arabic 
was tested by seeking views of a number of speakers of both Arabic and English who also 
had academic and/or practical knowledge of financial reporting 
Twenty-eight interviews were conducted with various stakeholders in order to elicit their 
perceptions about the quality of financial reporting, the phenomenon of earnings 
management, and other related issues including any motivations and constraints affecting the 
practice of earnings management in the Libyan banking sector. A statistical summary of the 
interviewees’ responses to the questions is given in Appendix 3.  
The interviews were conducted in the two main cities of Libya: Benghazi and Tripoli, the 
capital. The first 20 interviews took place in the period of Jun-Aug 2011 in the city of 
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Benghazi at a time when the capital had not been liberated5. The remaining eight interviews 
were conducted in Tripoli in June 2012. In this study the interviews were conducted face to 
face with all respondents. The interviewees were selected on the basis that they possessed 
knowledge and experience relevant to contributing to the research objectives. At the 
beginning, interview appointments were arranged through telephone calls made to existing 
contacts6. In a number of cases interviewees were also able to recommend other key persons 
who could be interviewed to gain more insightful information. Interviewees were sought 
from four groups (see Table 1) namely: Preparers (PR), Auditors (AD), Regulators (RG), and 
Users (US). Some interviewees hold more than one position. For example, PR5 is a bank 
chairman, external auditor and academic.  
 
Table 1: Interviewee Groups 
Group Position Qualification Country Location 
Preparers 
PR1 Chairman  MSc USA Commercial bank 
PR2 
Head of Correspondent Banking 
Office 
MSc Libya 
Commercial bank 
PR3 Member of BoD  PhD USA Commercial bank 
PR4 Head of Accounting Dept. BSc Libya Commercial bank 
PR5 Chairman  PhD UK Commercial bank 
PR6 
Head of Accounts Preparing 
Dept. 
BSc Libya 
Commercial bank 
PR7 
Head of Accounts Preparing 
Dept. 
BSc 
Libyan 
Commercial bank 
PR8 Head of Correspondent Banking  BSc Libya Commercial bank 
PR9 
Vice Manager of Eastern 
Branches Management 
Primary 
School 
Libya 
Commercial bank 
PR10 Head of Finance and Control MSc Libya Commercial bank 
PR11 Head of Financial Management BSc Libya Commercial bank 
PR12 
Assistant Manager of 
Accounting Dept. 
Diploma Libya 
Commercial bank 
Auditors 
AD1 Auditor BSc Libya Audit firm 
AD2 Auditor Msc USA Audit firm 
AD3 Senior Partner  PhD UK Audit firm 
AD4 Managing Partner BSc Libya Audit firm 
Regulators 
RG1 Chief of Benghazi Branch  MSc USA LAAA 
RG2 Inspector of commercial banks BSc Libya CBL 
RG3 Inspector of commercial banks MSc Libya CBL 
RG4 
Banking Exchange Control 
Dept. 
BSc Libya CBL 
RG5 Governor Deputy of CBL MSc Libya CBL 
                                                 
5 On 15th Feb, 2011, uprising events started in Benghazi and spread out to all the other cities in Libya; this 
revolution concluded with a declaration ending the dictatorship era on 23rd October 2011 (BBC, 2012a and b). 
6 The researcher benefited from being an external auditor in Libya. 
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(Benghazi branch) 
RG6 
Vice General Manager, Tax 
Dept. 
BSc 
Libya 
Tax Authority 
RG7 
Head of Listing and Follow-up 
Dept. 
BSc 
Libya 
LSM 
RG8 
Head of Internal Audit at  the 
Libyan Stock Market 
BSc 
Libya 
LSM 
RG9 
Manager of Surveillance & 
Follow-up Risks Dept. 
MSc 
Libya 
LSM 
RG10 
Legal Consultant at a 
commercial bank. 
BSc Libya Commercial bank 
Users 
US1 Lecturer PhD UK Benghazi Uni. 
US2 Lecturer PhD UK Benghazi Uni. 
Key:  PR= Preparer, RG= Regulator, AD= Auditor, US= Users. BoD= Board of Directors. MSc = Master’s 
Degree, BSc= Bachelor’s Degree, Diploma= Diploma Level Qualification. LAAA= the Libyan Accountants and 
Auditors Association, CBL= Central Bank of Libya, and LSM= Libyan Stock Market. 
 
All the interviews were recorded with the pre-permission of the interviewees. The interview 
recordings were later transcribed and translated into English.   
Results  
The Quality of Financial Reporting 
Participants were asked how they perceive the quality of financial reporting in Libya 
generally and in listed companies specifically. Interviewees expressed a variety of views 
about the quality of financial reporting that ranged from concerns about quality, to an 
inability to assess quality, to a perception that there was a high degree of quality. Interviewee 
PR3, who is a member of the Board of Directors of a commercial bank and who holds a PhD 
degree in financial management, replied to this question as follows:  
"The term quality is flexible; you don’t have standards to measure the quality. 
The question is not clear, there are no standards in Libya so how to assess the 
quality? Due to the absence of accounting standards one cannot assess the 
quality". 
IASB pronouncements are implicitly required by the Central Bank of Libya7 (CBL) for all 
Libyan Commercial Banks and explicitly by the Libyan Stock Market (LSM) for all listed 
companies. That suggests, from an accountability perspective, that in order for Libyan 
                                                 
7 Although reference to IFRS was not explicitly made in the CBL regulations, the term “international standards” 
has been interpreted by many as IFRS. In the experience of the researcher this is the general view taken by the 
commercial banking community and auditors.   
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Commercial Banks to be accountable to their shareholders, financial statements have to be 
prepared accordingly; otherwise accountability would be impaired. Although IFRS are 
required by the LSM in preparing accounts, they are typically still not yet applied in practice. 
The reason behind that, according to PR3, is related to lack of knowledge on how to apply 
IFRS. This interviewee challenged the interviewer to find a person in Libya who understands 
IFRS.8 
Financial reporting quality, according to RG8, could be measured by whether the financial 
statements are suitable for decision making. He answered this question by saying: 
"How to measure the quality? I would do that in respect of its usefulness for 
decision makers". 
The lack of accounting standards, according to some interviewees, might be the reason why 
financial reporting quality in Libya is low with no difference being observed between listed 
and unlisted companies. AD3, for example, stated: 
"It is a big question. It is not a stock market issue, rather a general issue that 
applies to all companies operating in Libya which is the lack of accounting 
standards". 
It could be said, according to this quotation, that either the issuance of local standards or 
adopting the international ones would improve the quality of financial reporting and thus 
accountability. One of the key qualitative characteristics that accounting information should 
have is stability which in the absence of accounting standards, would be unreachable. The 
lack of accounting standards would also affect the objectivity and verifiability of accounting 
information. 
Another interviewee RG9 agreed with this notion and commented on the quality of financial 
reporting by stating: 
"The financial reporting quality is very weak. Moreover, there is no difference 
in quality between listed and unlisted companies because of no accounting 
                                                 
8 He was holding the huge book of IFRS while stating, “You will never find anyone who understands this well 
even though they say according to IFRS, but the fact is it is not according to IFRS”. 
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standards. All we have is the broken record that is "according to GAAP" which 
we don’t have any definition of so that we can be clear on what it meant when 
someone uses this expression. No one exactly knows what the term GAAP 
means. When you and I disagree we don’t have any reference that we go to, so 
we should have a written GAAP, even if written on a cement bag. Thereby, the 
quality is zero due to no accounting standards". 
However, it was expected, by the researchers, that the LSM would have an influence over the 
quality of financial reporting and thus accountability. Therefore, this unexpected assertion is 
worth noting as it is made by RG9 whose work location is the LSM which implies a 
reasonably wide knowledge about the financial reporting quality of listed companies. One 
could infer that the LSM has not improved the accountability of listed companies. 
From the interviews, it appears that financial reporting in Libya is unduly dependent on 
management judgment and therefore subject to bias. Interviewee RG4 said of financial 
reporting quality: 
"They [financial statements] are biased to management; managers do use these 
reports to make themselves appear as successful. They are not good on 
average". 
This may suggest a conflict of interest between agents and principals given that managers 
may have, according to RG4, managed the financial statements to protect their jobs.  
The interview results suggest the reasons behind the perceived low quality of financial 
reporting of the Libyan Commercial Banks. Based on these interviews’ findings, several 
perceptions were revealed: a lack of standards; the absence of local GAAP; the lack of 
knowledge on how to implement IFRS; and management bias. The majority view of those 
interviewed was that financial reporting quality was not good. However, some other 
interviewees, mainly preparers, did perceive the quality of financial reporting to be good. 
PR1, for example, answered this question briefly by saying "I think it is good". PR6 
attributed the good quality of banks' financial reporting to the fact that their reporting is 
audited. He indicated:  
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"… the financial statements are approved by the external auditor and therefore 
they are of good quality". 
For PR12, the quality of banks' financial reporting is good and the reason behind that is that 
the financial statements of banks have satisfied their required needs. He said: 
"I can say that the financial reporting quality is, to some extent, good. As for the 
institution I work for, the financial statements have led to the purpose for which 
they have been prepared ...". 
 
Earnings Management Awareness 
There is widespread agreement amongst western accounting practitioners and academics that 
earnings management is pervasive and therefore widely known within both the academic and 
practitioner communities (Levitt, 1998; Loomis, 1999). The following set of questions 
examines the participants’ experiences and understanding of the earnings management issue.   
First of all, interviewees were asked whether they were familiar with the term and what they 
understood by this term. In cases where an interviewee had not heard of earnings 
management, the definition by Healy and Wahlen (1999) was used to explain the meaning of 
the term in order to have comparable answers for the remaining questions. Earnings 
management, according to Healy and Wahlen (1999), occurs when: 
“… managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions 
to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (p. 368). 
The interview findings show that 79% (22) of the interviewees had not heard about the term 
“earnings management”.  
Then, and prior to the explanation of the above definition, interviewees were asked what they 
understood by the term “earnings management”. Typically interviewees were drawn to a 
literal translation as most of the responses revolved around how to create and invest earned 
profits through a specific department, (in other words they thought that it referred to 
allocating and investing earnings that had been achieved). It is worth mentioning that some of 
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the respondents, for instance, PR3 and RG2 who asserted that they had heard of the term, 
actually referred to the same meaning, that is, a department for creating and investing earned 
profits. Only five of the 28 executives interviewed identified earnings management as a 
manipulative behaviour to manage the earnings figure. 
Interviewee PR1 who is a commercial bank chairman, holding a master’s degree in 
accounting, commented: 
"I think it means how to create profit and how to manage the work so as to 
achieve more profits". 
Interviewee PR10 saw earnings management as meaning distributing the earnings to 
shareholders. Another interviewee, PR11, went further in describing the meaning of earnings 
management by saying: 
"The term refers to a dedicated department that is mainly responsible for 
following up and improving the company's profits". 
Interviewee RG4 supported these ideas by saying: 
"The term means establishing a department to invest the realised profits". 
It appears that the problem in misunderstanding comes from the word "management" since 
most of the interviewees are employees for whom the word has only one meaning. For 
example, RG8 indicated: 
"Management means a management that plans and controls activities. Earnings 
management then is a management that is concerned with planning and 
controlling the earnings in terms of retaining control of revenues and focusing 
on profitable activities". 
Interview findings suggest that the literal Arabic translation of the term "earnings 
management" is the reason for the term not being understood in its conventional sense. The 
Arabic translation9 of “earnings management” could easily be taken to refer to a department 
which has responsibility for monitoring and controlling of earnings. It should be noted that 
                                                 
9 The literal Arabic translation of earnings management (Edaret Al-arbah) has been interpreted as the unit or 
department in which earnings were planned, controlled and managed. 
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this Arabic translation, which was initially presented to the interviewees, has been used in 
several Arabic studies on earnings management, e.g. Issa (2008), Abo-Ijela and Hamdan 
(2012), and Al-Sartawi et al. (2013).  It therefore appears that Arabic terminology should be 
used with care and that a term that translates literally as earnings manipulation, rather than as 
earnings management, would reduce the risk of misunderstanding. 
When the definition in Healy and Whalen (1999) was offered to interviewees they readily 
identified the meaning of earnings manipulation. RG1 stated: 
"This term is not in circulation… by this, the term refers to the disposal or use 
of the profit. I think it is a matter of translation. The term earnings manipulation 
should instead be used". 
Similarly, RG6 suggests: 
"At first glance, I understand it as the proper use of income. I think the name is 
a little strange. It might be the translation". 
Earnings management, as a term, is widely unknown amongst the interviewees, across all 
stakeholders groups. However, it is believed that the practice does, or is likely to, exist in 
Libya. In this vein, PR5 suggests: 
"I have not seen any research asserting that earnings management does exist in 
Libya, but based on accounting policies for depreciation, inventory and tax 
purposes which give some margin to managers, I would expect it to occur". 
Earnings Management Existence 
Interviewees were asked to indicate to what extent they think earnings management is 
practiced in Libya generally and it was found that perceptions varied. Some believe that 
earnings management does really exist while others believe otherwise. 
The results reveal that 53.5% of the interviewees believe that earnings management is 
practiced in Libya, while 35.7% of the interviewees hold the opposite view that earnings 
management is not practiced by Libyan corporations. Given that the prevalence of earnings 
management may be related to the existence of low quality financial reporting, it can imply a 
relatively weak accountability process. Given that over half of the interviewees think that 
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Libyan corporations are engaged in earnings management practices, one may argue that 
accountability is widely seen to be impaired for this reason. 
More specifically, interviewees’ perceptions about the practice and possible techniques of 
earnings management by the Libyan Commercial Banks were investigated. Eight out of 12 
preparers believe that earnings management is not practiced by the Libyan Commercial 
Banks, while 11 other stakeholders think that it is strongly practiced. 
Notably, unlike most of the preparers, regulators believe that earnings management is 
practiced by LCBs. For example, RG1 suggested that LCBs, to a large extent, are 
manipulating their income.  He stated: “banks do manipulate earnings to a large extent”. 
In the same vein, RG4 believes that the practice is very common, stating: “Yes, almost all 
banks practice it [earnings management]”. 
PR12, who does not believe that earnings management is practiced by LCBs, offered the 
statement below10: 
"Last year (201111) we incurred a loss while another commercial bank has 
booked a net profit of 200m Libyan dinar which in fact is not real. 2011 was the 
year of revolution and there was an economic recession in which the loan 
provision should be calculated for those loans that have not moved during the 
year and of course there was no movement on those loans which makes them, 
according to central bank regulations, regarded as bad loans and thereby proper 
provision should be calculated which has not happened with that bank. And 
instead they have calculated the interest and have not made any provisions". 
According to AD4, the continual process of reporting positive results (income) by the LCBs 
represents a strong piece of evidence that these banks are managing their income. He 
commented: 
"Yes, I think they [banks] try to have their results positive [profits]. The 
evidence from reporting is that there is no bank which incurred a loss". 
                                                 
10 While his quotation clearly suggests that earnings management does exist within local banks, his answer was 
extremely opposite by saying that the practice does not exist. It would seem that he was defending his bank’s 
reputation given that he is the chief accountant there, as noted by the researcher. 
11 The year 2011 was exceptional as it witnessed the revolution of 17th Feb and there was little commercial 
activity.  It may reasonably be expected to see banks reporting losses in such circumstances. 
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The findings of the interviews suggest that distrust exists between preparers and non-preparer 
stakeholders, as 67% of preparers assert that Libyan commercial banks are not engaged in 
earnings management practices, while 69% of non-preparer stakeholders believe that 
earnings management is widely practiced by the Libyan Commercial Banks.  
As discussed earlier, there is a strongly held belief amongst non-preparer stakeholders, that 
earnings management is widely exercised in LCBs. The findings of this question are in line 
with what may be expected according to their positions. Preparers, who can be regarded as 
agents, may be expected to defend the quality of financial reporting and to declare that these 
reports are free from bias. In other words, the financial reporting, according to them, may be 
subjective but not biased by management. Therefore, management can be accountable to the 
principal while providing them with subjective accounting information. On the other hand, 
other groups’ perceptions are different. The majority of Regulators believe that earnings 
management is practiced by the LCBs, while only half of interviewed Auditors have 
expressed the view that this practice exists, (although it was only a small sample of 4 
auditors) and one of them (AD1) had not actually engaged in the auditing of any commercial 
banks at the time of the interview. In the Users group, only one (of two) agreed on the view 
that earnings management is practiced. The overall findings reveal, in addition to the distrust 
issue, perceptions of a lack of legislation to ensure that accountability can be effectively 
discharged. It was apparent, based on the interview findings, that the absence of (formalised) 
local accounting standards, in particular, may give the opportunity for bank managers to 
indulge in earnings management practices12 which may lead to a breach in the accountability 
relationship. 
                                                 
12 However, of course, earnings management could be practiced even with the existence of accounting 
standards. 
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Earnings Management Techniques 
The accounting literature suggests that the loan loss provision (LLP) is a vehicle that can 
readily be used for earnings management. LLPs are designed to reflect the sum of funds that 
are likely to be lost in the future (Bhat, 1996). According to Wahlen (1994), LLPs reveal the 
expected future loan losses to be disclosed in the current period as accrued expenses on the 
income statement. Interviewees were asked to specify any techniques they are aware of that 
could be used by LCBs to manage earnings and most of the interviewees’ answers revolved 
around LLPs. AD3, for example, said, when asked how earnings could be managed: 
"Through the provisions, especially in banks, as provisions can have a very 
significant effect on the earnings figure. There is a criterion on how to calculate 
the LLP regulated by the CBL, but it is a bit long and difficult to apply and there 
are always subjective points which we, as auditors, are facing. Managers are 
always trying to justify the way they did the calculation". 
One of the Preparers, PR7, who is the chief accountant of a commercial bank with 11 years of 
experience, and who is one of the few preparers who thought earnings management occurs in 
the LCBs, answered this question, about how earnings management could be implemented, as 
follows: 
"… by using the provisions, management have only provisions to use. For 
example, the evaluation of foreign currency rate of exchange provision as well 
as the LLP. … when I was a member of the LLP committee; I happened to 
receive a telephone call from our chairman asking for a certain figure to be 
stated as the LLP that year". 
Also another way to manipulate the reported earnings could be by ignoring the booking of 
some expenses due or accruals. PR10 argued that this is a legal way to alter the reported 
income. He said: 
"An example for a legal way to lessen the expenses might be dealing with those 
expenses that are neither booked nor which the bank is yet asked to pay. A bank 
may wish not to show such expenses in accounts as long as it is not yet required 
to pay it". 
PR11 supported the idea of not booking some accruals or unpaid invoices as long as the 
provider has not asked for money. His response was: 
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"Accrual expenses may also be used to manage earnings. For instance, if you 
did not receive the invoice you may not book it. LLP represents the big item in 
the bank's accounts and despite the restricted procedures imposed by the CBL, 
there is still a space for discretion". 
Although they clearly stated that it was a legal way to manage earnings, it is obviously a 
contravention of any GAAP to ignore the booking of incurred current period expenses. Based 
on such quotations one may argue that not only is earnings management practiced in the 
LCBs, but also that, on occasions, fraud is committed by intentionally omitting financial 
transactions and thereby overstating earnings.  
According to the CBL regulations, a provision is calculated as the difference between a debt 
that has gone bad and 80% of the warranty that was given as a guarantee. PR11 suggests that 
this warranty might be re-evaluated so as to lessen or cancel the provision calculation.  
In addition to the re-evaluation of the warranties, managers may contact some deteriorating 
clients asking them to pay in some money so that the manager would be able to change the 
client's classification and thereby avoid any need for a provision calculation. RG4 referred to 
this method. He said: 
"They mainly use the LLP. They can change the classification of some debtors 
so that the allowance would be decreased. They also may contact some debtors 
asking them to make some deposits in their accounts in order to mobilize the 
accounts and thus the debtor classification would easily be changed from bad to 
good debt". 
Banks may also use “set-aside interests” for earnings management. When a client faces any 
difficulties in paying the interest, a loan will be classified as a bad debt; interest is calculated 
and booked as a set-aside interest provision. PR12 indicated: 
"They can use the set-aside profits [interest] to increase the current year income 
or they may save some revenue for next year. Set-aside profits are those 
revenues on deteriorating debts that have been calculated but not booked as 
revenues ". 
Beside set-aside interest provision, managers may tend to calculate interest for the off-interest 
periods. Some loans may have the first year interest-free and the borrower is then only asked 
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to pay interest starting from the second year. RG2 mentioned that banks may ignore this 
procedure and include the interest in the first year accounts. He stated: 
"They might use the previous allowances to boost earnings. Also, sometimes 
they calculate interest during the off-interest period. They might also expand or 
reduce expenses. For example, last year a bank realised 10m Libyan dinar 
profits and is planning to realise 12m next year. They will be monitoring the 
expenses in order to achieve this goal. They misuse the CBL circular regarding 
the LLP. This circular is not correctly applied. It depends on who's in charge of 
ethics". 
Simply, current year revenues are those revenues earned in the year. RG3 mentioned that 
some banks use the next period's interest to boost earnings in the current year. This procedure 
was described as having been implemented by a foreign partner at one of the banks that has 
strategic participation with foreign investors.  He indicated: 
"Most banks try to raise income through reducing the expenses and including 
deferred revenues [interest]. One of the commercial banks has applied this 
practice through the strategy partner [foreign management]; they include the 
interest of the coming two years into the current year and justify it [on the 
grounds] that the client is credible and that they have changed the accounting 
base from cash to accrual". 
Another problem with bank loans had been raised during an interview as some banks have 
very old loans that were made 40 years ago. During the last regime all commercial activities 
were nationalised. RG9 consider this problem as a loophole for earnings management. He 
said: 
"The provisions, we have had old loans for 40 years and they still appear in 
accounts and a lot of these loans are those which were made to companies that 
were taken into state ownership (nationalized) during the last regime.   In many 
cases those state owned companies then did not accept the responsibility to pay 
back the loans. They remain on the names of the original clients13". 
The majority of interviewees were of the view that the LLP is a primary method that can be 
used by LCBs for earnings management. Other ways have also been indicated as tools for 
managing the reported income, e.g. reducing expenses through not booking them. Although 
                                                 
13 The interviewee is referring to the fact that the nationalized companies were often renamed. While this should 
not of course affect companies’ liabilities, the researcher is aware of situations where banks have failed in legal 
attempts to trace and enforce repayment of such loans from companies that were taken over by the government. 
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this could be motivated in order to manage earnings (and may be regarded as such), it clearly 
strays beyond the flexibility allowed by accounting standards and constitutes fraudulent 
misrepresentation of earnings. The fact that LCBs’ financial reporting is regarded as being 
managed, however it is done, reveals that LCBs’ accounting information included in their 
financial statements may be regarded as biased. Based on the views of, and the evidence 
presented by, the interviewees, earnings management is not only assumed to be done, but is 
actually carried out. Therefore, both regulators and users should look for ways to deter such 
behaviour but in ways which would still permit the appropriate flexibility needed for the 
exercise of professional judgement in order to protect the quality of financial reporting. The 
next section addresses constraints that might be effective in mitigating the practice of 
earnings management by LCBs. 
Motivations for Earnings Management 
Half of the Preparers, when asked what may motivate banks’ managers to engage in earnings 
management practices, speculated that job security is the main reason. Eight of the 10 
Regulators agreed with this perception. This is in line with the earnings management 
literature (e.g. Norohna et al., 2008) which suggests job security as one of the key earnings 
management motivations. The Auditors generally perceived that earnings were managed in 
order to satisfy shareholders and show the firm in a favourable light, although that is not 
inconsistent with a job security motivation being also present. AD4 offered the following 
statement: 
"A number of reasons. The principal one is to satisfy the shareholders. 
Management always try to have a fixed rate of distributions". 
PR5 expressed the following view: 
"Firstly, it is a personal matter for managers to protect their job. Secondly, there 
is managers’ desire to increase the bank’s share price. Thirdly, sometimes a 
manager would receive a bonus that is tied to the net income". 
PR12 made the following statement: 
25 
 
"The reason is to improve the image of the management as seen by concerned 
parties such as the Central Bank of Libya and to extend the length of their 
employment tenure". 
RG1 differentiated between public, private and foreign companies and made the following 
observation: 
"Earnings manipulation is basically practiced for the reason of increasing the 
profits in public sector companies including banks in order to burnish the Board 
of Directors’ picture so as to secure the renewal of the assignment. In the private 
sector, banks’ profits are increased to strengthen the appearance of the balance 
sheet by which eventually the Board of Directors will be renewed for another 
period. And for family and foreign companies the incentive is to understate the 
profit to pay less tax". 
Earnings management, according to some views, is practiced to improve management’s 
image in the eyes of the owners. This can be achieved, according to the majority of 
responses, by distributing sufficient dividends in both private and public banks and such 
distributions require sufficient earnings to be reported. RG3, who is an inspector at the CBL, 
stated: 
"To distribute dividends, the public banks became more concerned about 
earnings management when they started to give a portion to employees recently 
since about four years ago. After this they tended to increase the profit so that 
they can pay dividends to employees and themselves as well".  
Another regulator, RG4, also commented: 
"They tend to increase the profits rather than decreasing them and they do that 
mainly to get shareholders satisfied and to have dividends". 
Managers may also be engaged in earnings management in order to cover a fraud. This notion 
emerged in the statement of US1, who is also an external auditor: 
"According to my experience, earnings management is practiced to cover 
corruption and to get some personal benefits in the form of a bonus. It is also 
practiced to satisfy shareholders so managers retain their positions". 
It is clear that there is a belief amongst the interviewees that earnings management is 
motivated by issues relating to job security and satisfying shareholders. These views imply 
that accountability is impaired due to doubts about the credibility of financial statements. The 
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next section considers how, notwithstanding the awareness of such motivations, earnings 
management may be deterred.  
Earnings Management Constraints 
This section considers the responses of interviewees to the question of what could affect 
earnings management practice. The interviews revealed a number of factors that might reduce 
earnings management. For example, AD4 suggested that CBL supervision and an internal 
control system would help in mitigating the practice.  
PR11 also stressed the role of regulators and tax authorities in addressing these issues. He 
stated: 
"The regulatory bodies, for example the central bank and external auditors as 
well as internal auditors [are important]… 
 
“When you minimise the expenses it sounds good with them but if you 
maximise expenses they will try to stop it". 
RG8 stated that regulators and auditors have to be taught about such issues so that they can 
affect the practice of earnings management. He said: 
"The knowledge and awareness of regulators and external auditors play a crucial 
role in mitigating it". 
As discussed above, the lack of accounting standards has been blamed for low quality in 
financial reporting which might be associated with earnings management. According to AD3, 
applying accounting standards would play a significant role in affecting earnings 
management behaviour. He stated that what was needed was: 
"…accounting standards that clearly show how to account for revenues and how 
to apply recognition. Also, making the provisions calculation process clear and 
simple in a way that is easy to apply since making loans is the core business of 
banks". 
RG9 also supported the notion that accounting standards have a principal role in mitigating 
the practice of earnings management. He stated: 
"First of all, there should be accounting standards that are clear and able to 
remedy the issue along with the supervision over the companies by the CBL and 
the LSM". 
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Also, AD1 considered the importance of accounting standards in constraining earnings 
management practice, as well as the CBL, and the internal and external auditors. He 
mentioned that the lack of professional management would have an influence on earnings 
management activities. He summed up what was needed as follows: 
"The presence of accounting standards that are applicable, internal and external 
control including by the CBL and auditors, and finally suitably qualified 
management within banks".   
Based on the interview findings there is clearly a view in some groups that the accountability 
process is seriously affected by the absence of accounting standards and the weakness of 
monitoring bodies. These issues will now be considered.  
The Role of Accounting Standards 
In this part of the interview, interviewees were asked whether they thought that IFRS, if 
applied, would have any effect on the practice of earnings management. 
A majority of the interviewees (21, or 75%) agreed that IFRS would have a positive impact 
on earnings management and that it would improve financial reporting quality. This result 
reflects the interviewees’ belief that adopting IFRS would restrict earnings management and 
the accountability mechanism would, therefore, be effectively enhanced.  
However, it was also thought that adopting IFRS in Libya would not be a smooth process as 
applying IFRS in their entirety might not be the right solution even if it was to be enforced by 
the State. RG9 and AD4 suggested that IFRS should be applied step by step. The interviewee 
RG9 recommended: 
"The wisdom is to apply IFRS gradually, not all in one go. Also, it is not a 
button to press; to apply the IFRS you need to train staff about it which would 
take time". 
Another interviewee agreed with this notion. AD4 similarly said: 
"Our standards should be IFRS. My view is to apply IFRS gradually since not 
all IFRS are applicable". 
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In contrast, some interviewees seem to have a different perception about IFRS. US1, for 
example, considers that local standards are more suitable, and therefore more applicable, than 
their international counterparts. He said: 
"No, the international standards are not good for the Libyan environment. The 
good standards are those applicable (local) standards." 
Similarity, RG6 believes that accounting standards should be a product of the surrounding 
environment. His comment was as follows: 
"I don’t believe in international standards. Standards should be derived from the 
environment". 
Whichever accounting standards were to be applied (i.e. local standards or IFRS), the 
importance of such a framework was stressed by most of the interviewees since the 
accountability process would be less effective without them. Therefore, based on the 
interview findings that 75% of interviewees perceive that IFRS would produce high quality 
financial reporting, it could be suggested that adopting IFRS would play a positive role in an 
accountability system. However, there is a view that great care should be taken over the way 
in which they are adopted (i.e. gradually). 
The Role of Corporate Governance 
Another important factor in mitigating the practice of earnings management that was 
discussed during the interviews was the role of good corporate governance. This section 
seeks to explore the interviewees’ perceptions regarding how good corporate governance 
could influence the exercise of earnings management. Twenty five interviewees (89%) 
believed that good corporate governance would effectively mitigate the practice of earnings 
management. According to PR10, for example: 
"It will constrain the management and prevent it from overriding the normal 
procedures. Good corporate governance will separate functions so it would be 
difficult for managers to manage earnings". 
One may argue, based on such a finding, that in order for an effective accountability 
mechanism to be applied, corporate governance codes, among other things, should be 
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practiced. The potential of such a development could be affected by the position of the 
interviewee (i.e. as agent or principal), as some seem to be against corporate governance and 
consider it as having no influence on earnings management. PR1, the chairman of a 
commercial bank, completely disagreed on the value of corporate governance in general and 
thinks that it is not applicable in Libya due to the general lack of qualifications and in 
particular the lack of suitably qualified senior managers. He said: 
"I am against corporate governance, the application of Basel Regulations 2 and 
314, and formal segregation of duties between a chairman and chief executive in 
Libya as there is no corporate governance and insufficient qualified staff. For 
me it is impractical nonsense which works only in theory". 
One of the interviewees, RG6, suggested that earnings management might be exercised even 
with an improved regulatory framework; when asked about the prospect of improved 
corporate governance deterring earnings management, he answered: 
"I don’t think so. Earnings management could be practiced within laws and with 
good intent". 
On the other hand, according to RG4, good corporate governance, even if it does not resolve 
the issue, would at least control it. It is arguably needless to stress the importance of the role 
of corporate governance in the accountability process. However, the above discussion reveals 
the awareness by some interviewees regarding the important role that good corporate 
governance could play in improving financial reporting quality and thus the accountability 
process. Better corporate governance can increase public confidence in the integrity of the 
financial reporting process and in the credibility of the accounting information generated by 
the entity. Some corporate governance rules may restrict the actions of LCBs’ managers and 
make them work in the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
As noted above, a large majority of interviewees believe in the potential benefits of applying 
good corporate governance in relation to reducing earnings management by LCBs. In other 
                                                 
14Basel can broadly be defined as a set of banking regulations that determine the minimum level of capital 
requirements in order to minimize credit risk.   
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words, accountability in LCBs is perceived to be potentially enhanced, at least partially, by 
applying good corporate governance.  
Other factors may of course play a vital role in promoting financial reporting quality, for 
instance there is the role of external auditing, however, this topic is beyond the scope of this 
paper. On one hand the paper has already reached its word limitation. On the other hand, 
researchers do believe that the topic of the role of auditing is thought to justify another paper. 
Discussion 
The interview findings indicate that a significant portion of interviewees (57%) view the 
quality of financial reporting as being not good. The interview findings also revealed that 
there is a lack of understanding of the terminology and the concept of earnings management. 
Twenty two interviewees (79%) had not heard of the term and when they were asked about 
the term’s connotation, apparently some of these who indicated that they were familiar with 
the term actually did not understand the conventional meaning of it as 82% of the 
interviewees interpreted the term as meaning how to invest and re-use the earned profits. The 
findings suggest that the translation of the term may have led to this misinterpretation and 
that “earnings manipulation” might be a more informative expression. 
Interview findings suggest that earnings management is relatively widely practiced within 
LCBs as 53.5% of interviewees believe that LCBs are engaged in earnings management 
practices. Given the impact earnings management would have on the quality of financial 
reporting it can be said, based on the interviewees’ perceptions, that LCBs financial reporting 
is affected by the practice of earnings management and therefore is, or at the least may be 
perceived to be, of reduced quality which may reveal a serious threat to the accountability 
system for LCBs stakeholders. 
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Interview findings also suggest that the loan loss provision (LLP) is a key mechanism 
(though not the only one) by which bank managers alter reported income; this was referred to 
by 64% of interviewees who believe the LLP is being used by LCBs to manage earnings. One 
of the main factors that make such behaviour easy for LCBs’ managers, as per interviewees’ 
perceptions, is the absence of local accounting standards. Based on all the above discussion, 
one can say that the accountability of LCBs is under threat. 
In regards to what motivates bank managers to indulge in the earnings management practices, 
overview results indicate that about 50% of interviewees view job security as a principal 
factor to induce bank managers to engage in earnings management practices.  
However, interviewees’ responses did indicate broad support for steps that could be taken to 
deter earnings management and strengthen accountability through improved financial 
reporting quality. These were the implementation, in practice rather than in theory, of 
International Financial Reporting Standards, and improved corporate governance.     
Conclusion  
The limitations of this study should be borne in mind when assessing the evidence presented.  
The interviews were limited in number, and this was particularly the case when considering 
the representation of each group of interviewees.  The interview method typically trades off 
an ability to explore issues in reasonable depth with a limited sample size.  Interviewees were 
selected based on their likely knowledge of, and familiarity with, financial reporting and 
regulation.     
Notwithstanding such limitations, the researchers submit that the results of the study should 
be useful to LCBs' stakeholders as well as other researchers. For instance, auditors should be 
interested in the fact that not only LLP is used to manage earnings. Regulators should also be 
interested in the evidence that earnings management exists and that financial reporting is 
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often perceived to be of low quality. Researchers and academics may find the literal Arabic 
translation of the term 'earnings management' to be an issue that should be taken into 
consideration in future research. 
The current findings may assist to fill a gap in the literature in respect of earnings 
management practices in Libya in general and in Libyan Commercial Banks (LCBs) in 
particular. There is a wide literature on earnings management in developed countries; 
however, less is dedicated to developing countries. Due to differing environmental factors 
between developed and developing countries this study also has relevance in this regard.  
This study provides evidence on current earnings management techniques that LCBs are 
thought to be using. This contribution to knowledge is potentially of interest to all 
stakeholders given the importance of financial reporting quality and accountability. In 
particular, both auditors and regulators of LCBs may benefit through better understanding of 
how such a topic could affect their roles. According to Beaudoin et al. (2013), the practice of 
earnings management has led to regulatory changes as a response to the downfall of some 
high profile corporations that have been engaged in the practice. In particular, regulators of 
commercial banks may be concerned, according to Cohen et al. (2014, p. 174), with the LLP. 
The treatment of the LLP has a direct impact on reported earnings and regulators may view 
LLP as a “type of capital that can be used to absorb losses”.  
Avenues for future research in developing country environments include the role of the 
external auditor in relation to such practices, as well as stakeholders’ views on the ethics of 
earnings management in principle, and the ethics of particular practices. 
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Appendix 1 
Interview Questions List (English) 
 
1- What is your opinion about the overall quality of financial reporting in Libya, 
particularly for listed companies? 
2- Are you familiar with the term earnings management? 
3- What do you mean by the term earnings management? 
4- Do you think that earnings management is practiced in Libya and if so, to what 
extent? 
5- In particular, do you think that earnings management is practiced in the banking 
sector and if so, to what extent? 
6- Are you aware of any techniques that may be used to manage earnings both generally 
and particularly in the banking sector? 
7-  What in your view are the possible motives for earnings management both in general 
and in the banking sector? 
8- Which factors do you think may influence the extent of earnings management? 
9- Do you think that adopting IFRS could affect earnings management? How? 
10- Could you comment on the impact of good corporate governance in relation to 
earnings management? 
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 2 xidneppA
 )cibarA( tsiL snoitseuQ weivretnI
 
 للشركات المقيدة بسوق الاوراق المالية؟ما هو تقييمكم لمستوى جودة التقارير المالية فى ليبيا وخصوصا  -1
 هل سمعت عن مصطلح إدارة الأرباح؟ -2
 من عبارة "إدارة الارباح"؟ يقصدماذا  -3
 هل تعتقد بتطبيق او ممارسة إدارة الأرباح فى ليبيا؟ والى أى مدى؟ -4
 على وجه الخصوص، هل تعتقد أن المصارف الليبية تقوم بإدارة الأرباح؟ والى أى مدى؟ -5
 أى فكرة عن كيفية إدارة الأرباح فى الشركات بصفة عامة والمصارف بصفة خاصة؟هل لديك  -6
 ح عموما وفى القطاع المصرفي بصفة خاصة؟اما هى برأيك الدوافع المحتملة لإدارة الأرب  -7
 ما هى العوامل برأيك التى قد تحد من إدارة الأرباح؟ -8
 مكانية تطبيق إدارة الارباح؟ كيف؟هل تعتقد بأن تطبيق المعايير الدولية يمكن أن يؤثر فى إ -9
 ما هو تعليقك على تأثير تطبيق الحوكمة الجيدة على إدارة الأرباح؟  -01
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Appendix 3 
Summary of the findings for each of the interviewee groups 
 
Questions Preparers Auditors Regulators Users 
Interviewees’ 
Reponses to 
Financial 
Reporting 
Quality 
Assessment 
75 % of preparers 
(9) view financial 
reporting quality is 
good, 8% unable to 
assess the quality 
and 17% see it not 
good. 
100% of Auditors 
(4) regard the 
financial reporting 
quality as not good 
80% of Regulators 
(8) perceive the 
quality of financial 
reporting as being 
not good 
100% of Users (2) 
see the financial 
reporting quality as 
not good 
Interviewees’ 
Responses about 
Familiarity with 
the term 
“Earnings 
Management” 
 
9 of preparers 
(75%) have not 
heard of the term.  
4 of auditors 
(100%) have not 
heard of the term. 
8 of Regulators 
(80%) said that they 
have not heard 
about the term. 
Only one  User 
(50%) has not heard 
of the term 
The meanings 
attributed to the 
term “Earnings 
Management” 
9 of Preparers 
(75%) interpret 
earnings 
management as a 
department for 
monitoring profits 
or as how to invest 
the earned profits. 
50% of Auditors 
viewed earnings 
management as 
being earnings 
manipulation 
8 out of 10 
Regulators consider 
earnings 
management as to 
invest the earned 
profits 
Only one User 
(50%) recognised 
earnings 
management 
The Scope of 
Earning 
Management 
Practices by 
Libyan 
Corporations 
58% (7) of 
preparers think that 
earnings 
management is not 
practiced by Libyan 
corporations 
75% of auditors 
believe earnings 
management does 
exist within Libyan 
corporations 
60% of regulators 
confirm that 
earnings 
management is 
exercised by Libyan 
corporations  
50% of users think 
earnings 
management is 
practiced by Libyan 
corporations 
The Scope of 
Earnings 
Management 
Practices in the 
Libyan 
Commercial 
Banks 
 
Only 4 Preparers 
out of 12 (33%) 
believe earnings 
management is 
practiced in the 
Libyan Commercial 
Banks 
2 Auditors out of 4 
(50%) think that 
earnings 
management is 
practiced by Libyan 
Commercial Banks 
8 Regulators out 10 
(89%) believe that 
Libyan Commercial 
Banks are engaged 
in earnings 
management 
practices 
1 (50%) of Users 
believes that 
earnings 
management is 
practiced within 
LCBs 
The Used 
Earnings 
Management 
Tools by LCBs 
9 Preparers (75%) 
believed that LLP 
could be used to 
manage LCBs’ 
income 
2 Auditors (50%) 
think that LLP is 
the way how LCBs 
manage their 
earnings 
6 Regulators (60%) 
view LLP as used 
by LCBs for 
earnings 
management 
1 Users (50%) 
believes that LLP to 
be used by LCBs 
for earnings 
management 
Earnings 
Management 
5 of Preparers 
(42%) consider job 
security as an 
3 Auditors (75%) 
view dividends to 
shareholders as 
8 Regulators (80%) 
regard job security 
as an earnings 
2 Users (100%) 
perceive job 
security as being a 
40 
 
Motivation in 
the Libyan 
Commercial 
Banks 
earnings 
management 
motivation for 
LCBs 
being earnings 
management 
motivation for 
LCBs 
management 
motivation for 
LCBs 
motivation to 
manage the reported 
earnings by LCBs 
IFRS Influence 
on Financial 
Reporting 
Quality by 
Interviewees 
11 preparers (91%) 
believed IFRS 
would positively 
affect the earnings 
management 
practices and 
therefore improve 
reporting quality 
All 4 (100%) of 
auditors believe that 
adopting IFRS 
leads to mitigating 
earnings 
management 
practices 
6 (60%) out of 10 
regulators think 
applying IFRS 
would reduce the 
earnings 
management 
practices and 
therefore, financial 
reporting quality 
could be improved 
The Users’ 
responses come 
somehow 
differently, where 
only 1 user (50%) 
think of no positive 
impact for adopting 
the IFRS on 
earnings 
management, others 
looks like not sure 
about the 
consequence of 
such a procedure 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
Influence on 
Financial 
Reporting 
Quality 
11 Preparers  (91%) 
agree that good 
corporate 
governance would 
negatively impact 
earnings 
management 
practices 
All Auditors 
(100%) believe 
applying good 
corporate 
governance could 
deter managers of 
being engaged in 
earnings 
management 
practices 
8 Regulators (80%) 
think that good 
corporate 
governance can 
mitigate earnings 
management 
All Users (100%) 
showed their 
agreement as good 
corporate 
governance can 
affect the practice 
of earnings 
management 
 
